The fifth volume of Richard Rorty's "Philosophical papers" published by Cambridge University Press, consists of the works which American philosopher wrote at the very dawn of his career in 1960s and early 1970s. In these essays Rorty addresses issues of transcendental argumentation, the internalism/externalism controversy, mind-body dualism and psychophysical monism, semantic truth, reference and justification. Supplemented by Daniel Dennett's Foreword, the book gives an excellent idea of Rorty's «analytical» writings and his evolution from eliminative materialism to pragmatism.

The study of Kant’s anthropology, proposed by Viktor Kozlovskyi in its original and thorough monograph, is an entirely new interpretation of Kant’s answer to the fundamental question “What is man?”. On the basis of the philosopher’s heritage and taking into account the large body of research lit-erature, Kozlovskyi reconstructs five conceptual “human models” in Kant’s anthropological discourse. However, this study contains a number of problematic statements and conclusions. I argue first, that there is some inconsistency between Kant’s understanding of the (...) concept of “anthropology” and Ko-zlovskyi’s explanation. Second, the model of man as intelligible being, made explicit through the con-cepts of “freedom” and “spontaneity”, is a justified construction within the limits of criticism, but not quite correct with regard to the place and function of “anthropology” in it. Third, we can see a disso-nance between Kozlovskyi’s explanation of the constellations as “chronotopes-events” and interpreta-tion of this concept by Dieter Henrich’s school, where the methodology of “research constellations” was used to elucidate the early phase of German idealism. However, this leads to the cardinal question of how far this methodology is applicable for the analysis of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

This paper describes an agent that shows advices for supporting mediator on our online mediation support system. The purpose of the advice is an education of mediator, and the agent presents it instead of the teacher. In this research, at first, we defined a mediation model that is an argumentation model between 3 people. Then, we defined some advice models based on the mediation model. The advice models create advice elements. The adviser agent monitors the mediation, gathers advice elements referring (...) to advice models, and creates advice from elements according to the mediation scene. As a result, it becomes possible that is advising instead of the teacher according to the situation, education purpose and learner's level. We inspected the effectiveness of the advice by the experiment of moot mediation. (shrink)

The article continues the series of works devoted to the problem of methodological substantiation of the subject of philosophical anthropology, and thereby its substantiation as a strict science. The conversation is based on search materials carried out in the German classics of the ХХ century. The first article was devoted to the experience of E. Husserl. This article is devoted to the M. Scheler’s search. The author thus relies not so much on the published and very fragmentary works of M. (...) Scheler as on the drafts of the philosopher, his diaries, lying without the application for a long time. It turns out that M. Scheler did not so much build philosophical anthropology as a positive science, but rather understood it more as a methodological science, that is, as reflexive, in which a certain search method is built, precisely because a person acts not so much as an object or subject but as constantly open problem, the one that overcomes itself, its own measure. (shrink)

What is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) for a Bayesian? Is thinking of BARD in terms of probabilities a nonstarter? I propose an account of BARD compatible with Subjective Bayesianism that rejects the view that BARD is met by a threshold probability. BARD is a judgment, not merely about the credal state the factfinder endorses as her own (i.e. not merely as one’s own credence in guilt), but as about alternative possible credences, specifically those the factfinder does not endorse, (...) but finds reasonable. To this end, I employ a Bayesian framework, expounded by Lange (1999), that permits revision of past prior probability assignments. Such a framework presupposes a point of view free from one’s prior from which a prior is judged. A trier-of-fact asks whether doubt persists among any reasonable starting point one might take; if it does, acquittal is warranted. (shrink)

The purpose of the study was to analyse the influence of artificial intelligence on modern socio-cultural processes to identify key trends and factors determining its development, to reveal positive and negative aspects of the integration of artificial intelligence into various spheres of public life, including work, education, medicine, and cultural and social relationships. A methodology has been developed that defines the stages of analysing the socio-cultural impact of artificial intelligence. The main trends determining the influence of artificial intelligence on modern (...) socio-cultural processes were identified, which included automation of labour, changes in educational and medical practices, and the impact on cultural and social relationships. This provided an understanding of how the development of artificial intelligence leads to changes in the world of work, including the automation of routine tasks, the consequences for the labour market and employment. The use of artificial intelligence has changed teaching methods and educational programmes, and influenced schoolchildren, teachers, and educational institutions. The paper provided a comprehensive description of society’s perception of the use of artificial intelligence, revealing both its positive and negative aspects. The positive aspects included increased productivity, increased innovation, and improved services, while the negative aspects covered job losses, data privacy concerns, and ethical issues. The results showed that the integration of artificial intelligence into modern socio-cultural processes has significantly influenced society. The study identified a number of issues and challenges, including potential job losses, data privacy issues, and ethical issues. (shrink)

What is the role of the media in the construction of collectively shared ideas about the past? Our analysis of the coverage and framing of the dictatorship in current newspapers intends to contribute to the understanding of the ways in which media discourse uses the past to serve present political interests, related to an increase in revisionist political discourse. We conducted a discourse analysis of how the Uruguayan press approaches framing the latest dictatorship, to identify how key events in the (...) public discussion of the dictatorial past are defined in the present. Along with this, identified representations they construct in terms of responsibilities attributed to actors associated with the dictatorship. We found that journalistic practices tend to avoid explanations and elaborations of historical events reproducing historical narrative frames with no additional commentaries. They do this by reproducing historical framing through bundling up various source messages from social media, idiomatic phrases and intertextual links. The appeal to these discourse practices produces polyphonic texts with less lexical density that make comprehension more dependent on reader’s background knowledge. These mediated and mediatized memories reproduce hegemonic discourses about the meanings of the past through journalistic practices that erase responsibility contributing to revisionist discourses. (shrink)

In this essay, we draw on John Haugeland’s work in order to argue that Burge is wrong to think that exercises of perceptual constancy mechanisms suffice for perceptual representation. Although Haugeland did not live to read or respond to Burge’s Origins of Objectivity, we think that his work contains resources that can be developed into a critique of the very foundation of Burge’s approach. Specifically, we identify two related problems for Burge. First, if (what Burge calls) mere sensory responses are (...) not representational, then neither are exercises of constancy mechanisms, since the differences between them do not suffice to imply that one is representational and the other is not. Second, taken by themselves, exercises of constancy mechanisms are only derivatively representational, so merely understanding how they work is not sufficient for understanding what is required for something, in itself, to be representational (and thereby provide a full solution to the problem of perceptual representation). (shrink)

In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy's conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, and how they relate. Haugeland argued that “giving a damn” is essential for having a mind—suggesting that traditional approaches to cognitive science mistakenly overlook the relevance of caring to the understanding of mindedness. Haugeland's determination to expand philosophy's array of concepts led him to write on a wide variety of subjects that (...) may seem unrelated—from topics in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to examinations of such figures as Martin Heidegger and Thomas Kuhn. Haugeland's two books with the MIT Press, Artificial Intelligence and Mind Design, show the range of his interests. -/- This book offers a collection of essays in conversation with Haugeland's work. The essays, by prominent scholars, extend Haugeland's work on a range of contemporary topics in philosophy of mind—from questions about intentionality to issues concerning objectivity and truth to the work of Heidegger. Giving a Damn also includes a previously unpublished paper by Haugeland, “Two Dogmas of Rationalism,” as well as critical responses to it. Finally, an appendix offers Haugeland's outline of Kant's "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.” -/- Contributors Zed Adams, William Blattner, Jacob Browning, Steven Crowell, John Haugeland, Bennett W. Helm, Rebecca Kukla, John Kulvicki, Mark Lance, Danielle Macbeth, Chauncey Maher, John McDowell, Joseph Rouse. (shrink)

Limited communitarianism is presented as an alternative to classical communitarianism in African philosophy. Bernard Matolino, the proponent of this view, argues that personhood can be attained with the constitutive features of the self leading the process, as against the historical, classical communitarian view that prioritises the sociality of the self. He posits that it is a personhood conceived through such view as limited communitarianism that can guarantee individual rights and prioritises the claims of the individual in African philosophy. Matolino’s claim (...) is grounded on the view that Afro-communitarianism, as presented in the classical account such as the radical and moderate communitarianism of Menkiti and Gyekye, respectively, emphasises community essence in African philosophy and hinders the expression of rights. The claim of the classical view informs the nudge to question the relevance and compatibility of Afro- communitarianism with the complex, multicultural modern African societies. As a result, limited communitarianism rejects the mechanism of Afrocommunitarianism – essentialism. While limited communitarianism appears a rejection of what is known as Afro- communitarianism, which has earned it noncommunitarian labels such as being liberal and individualist, I argue that it is simply a well- argued form of moderate communitarianism that avoids the conundrum of community. (shrink)

n 1902, 70 million years after it tripped lightly through the Mesozoic forests in search of meat, the skeleton of a 20-foothightyrannosaurus was dynamited out of a sandstone bluff near Hell Creek, Mont. Wrapped in burlap and plaster and shipped back to New York, the bones were painstakingly reassembled by fossil curator Barnum Brown of the American Museum of Natural History. It was there, one day in 1947, that they happened to scare the bejesus out of 5-year-old Stephen Jay Gould. (...) With a mouthful of teeth as big as bananas, the great reptile gaped down at the little mammal who had usurped its place at the head of the food chain and set him scurrying for the safety of his daddy's pant leg. It was a sublime epiphany. Long after Gould could stare with equanimity at the skull of tyrannosaurus, he was left with the essential mystery that still motivates him as perhaps America's foremost writer and thinker on evolution: why should dinosaurs have ended up in human museums instead of—as one among an infinite number of evolutionary possibilities—the other way around? (shrink)

Karl Llewellyn’s critique of the canons of statutory interpretation led to a decline in their use for several decades. His critique, however, faced sustained resistance from some corners of the academy and the judiciary. Although this resistance has had only a selective uptake, it animated a gradual revival of the canons and brought the state of scholarship to an impasse that is for the most part partisan. In this article, I examine the semantic canons from a deeper level and argue (...) that a universal assumption about them is false. Said assumption is that, although not dispositive, the semantic canons at least offer some reasons in favour of or against a candidate interpretation. Inclinations to rely on the semantic canons are also based on this assumption, although it is an assumption that the critics of the canons also share. I argue that this assumption is false because the semantic canons are a class of rules that are by nature not reason-giving. This provides a new ground against giving the semantic canons deliberative weight in questions of statutory interpretation. (shrink)

Modernists T. S. Eliot's and W. B. Yeats's treatment of the transcendent moment, and postmodernists Samuel Beckett's and Graham Swift's handling of the perpetual present form two conflicting time worlds. The modernists' transcendent moment signifies a temporary release from the progressive stream of time. As a sudden flash of awareness, it offers a transcendental vision of reality. Contrariwise, the postmodernists' perpetual present is cut off from the past as well as the future, suggesting the infinite time of the middle. It (...) is dissociated from a transcendent reality and has no room for revelatory moments, which establishes its bleak character. (shrink)

Tevhid İslam inancının özünü oluşturan temel ilkedir. Yaratılışla beraber bütün peygamberlerin Allah adına ortaya koydukları akidedir. Bu inanç tek ilah çevresinde oluşan düşünme biçimini, hayat tarzını ifade eder. Bu bağlamda inanç, ibadet ve muamelat unsurlarının birbirleriyle anlamlı birlikteliğinin sonucudur. Tevhid sadece Allah’ın zatına yönelik söylemler olmayıp Allah-kâinat kilişkisinin nasıl işlediğini belirleyen sistemdir. Bu ilişkide Allah ile kâinat arasına etkin kuvvetler sokuşturmak mümkün değildir. Allah’ın, yaratıklarıyla özelde ise insanla olan ilişkisi esnasında O’nu pasif konumda bırakacak her türlü inanç ve düşünce tevhidin (...) karşısında yer almaktadır. Bu çalışmada İslam inancının temel doktrini olan tevhid inancının inşa süreci, bu bağlamda şirke yöneltilen eleştiriler Kur’ani perspektiften incelenecektir. Özellikle tevhidi anlatımların yoğunlaştığı alanlar belirlenecektir. Söz konusu anlatımların vahiy sürecindeki anlaşılma şekli ön plana çıkarılmaya çalışılacaktır. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has been challenged on empirical grounds by philosophical interpreters of situationist social psychology. Challenges are necessarily challenges to something or other, so it’s only possible to understand the situationist challenge to virtue ethics if we have an antecedent grasp on virtue ethics itself. To this end, I first identify the non-negotiable “hard core” of virtue ethics with the conjunction of nine claims, arguing that virtue ethics does make substantive empirical assumptions about human conduct. Next, I rearticulate the situationist (...) challenge in light of these nine claims. I then turn to a discussion of specifications of several responses typically made by defenders of virtue ethics against the situationist challenge, arguing that most of them either are unsound or give up one of the elements in the hard core. A few, however, survive this criticism, and so I conclude by suggesting ways in which the situationist challenge might be not so much resisted as co-opted. Situational influences can be used to help people simulate virtue, a phenomenon I call factitious virtue. (shrink)

P. F. Strawson famously distinguishes what a speaker presupposes from what she asserts in uttering a sentence like “The present King of France is bald”. This paper defends a claim about presupposition's epistemic significance, namely that presupposition can provide a distinctive testimony‐based way for an audience to learn about the world.

History and Decision in Heidegger’s Private Writings: The animal historicum and the Da-sein In this paper, we aim to reconstruct Heidegger’s critique of the modern conception of subjectivity, history and freedom, as it appears in his posthumous writings and in the Black Notebooks of the 1930’s and 1940’s. In order to do so, we will examine the meaning of decision ( Entscheidung ) and its links with the history of Be-ing ( Geschichte des Seyns ). Our first section will be (...) devoted to a critical reconstruction of Machenschaft as a symbol of our modern times. According to Heidegger, the Machenschaft represents a place in history where no new historical decisions can be made in any conceivable way, and humanity becomes an animal historicum. In spite of that, the way of a new beginning and a new decision concerning ourselves remains difficult but possible, a phenomenon that we analyze in our second section: how the essence of humanity can be transformed in Da-sein, but only if we think anew our relationship with being. (shrink)

This article is a critical appraisal of the two-level model of Holger Thesleff as an interpretive paradigm for the philosophy of Plato. The primary emphasis is on the metaphysics of the model, which revolves around the idea of a single world composed of two levels. Conceived as an alternative to the dualism of worlds traditionally attributed to Plato, the levels in question complement each other in a symbiotic relationship between intelligible phenomena and sensible matter, which jointly account for the whole (...) of reality without the complications associated with a multiplication of worlds. The principal complication in the latter scenario is the difficulty of meaningful interaction under circumstances of radical separation, especially with a strict segregation requiring two different worlds: one for transcendent Forms, one for instantiating particulars. That difficulty does not even come up in the two-level model, which confines everything to a single world, where the possibility of interaction is not undermined by the reality of separation or the severity of segregation. The two-level model avoids that issue altogether by keeping everything together. A purported problem with this monistic alternative, on the other hand, is the inherent impediment to transcendence within a single world, where there would seem to be no room for the requisite ascension. How indeed can anything transcend the only place that exists? Promoting a solitary world as the intended framework for Plato’s metaphysics ostensibly requires retaining some semblance of transcendence, or else providing an acceptable alternative to it, while compressing everything into the same reality. The ultimate goal of the present article is to show why, given a natural challenge to both approaches, that is, despite an apparent obstacle to either perspective, the two-level model is preferable to the two-world alternative. Progress toward that end unfolds as an effort to illustrate and vindicate the way Thesleff meets the methodological challenge to his brand of monism with a philosophical vision originating with Plato himself. (shrink)

Dini metinlerde önemine ve faziletine vurgu yapılan ve Müslümanlar tarafından yeryüzündeki üç büyük mescitten biri olarak kabul edilen Mescid-i Aksâ’nın, Kudüs topraklarında bulunduğu hususunda kadim Sünnî kaynaklar ittifak halindedir. Şiiler hariç yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısına kadar Müslümanlar arasında Mescid-i Aksâ’nın yerine dair herhangi bir tartışma olmadığı söylenebilir. Ancak bu tarihten itibaren çeşitli gerekçelerle farklı görüşler ve iddialar ortaya atılmış, mezkûr Mescid’in Kudüs’te bulunup bulunmadığı tartışma konusu yapılmıştır. Tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla bu tartışmaları başlatan ilk isim, 1953’de konuyla ilgili bir makale kaleme (...) alan İngiliz oryantalist Alfred Guillaume olmuştur. Guillaume, makalesinde bazı gerekçeler ileri sürerek Mescid-i Aksâ’nın Kudüs’te değil Mekke yakınlarındaki Ci‘râne bölgesinde olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Bilahare Türkiye’deki kimi muasır araştırmacılar da gerekçeleri kısmen farklılık arz etse de sonuç itibariyle bu konuda Guillaume ile aynı görüşü paylaşmışlardır. Bu hususta yapılan tartışmaların ve yorumların ne derece gerçekçi olup olmadığını ortaya koymak ve sağlıklı bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutmak, başta İsrâ hadisesi olmak üzere bazı tarihî vak’aların doğru anlaşılması açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Binaenaleyh bu makalede, Guillaume’nin Mescid-i Aksâ’nın yerine dair farklı görüş ve yaklaşımları eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla ele alınarak değerlendirmeye tabi tutulmaktadır. (shrink)

Peygamberler diyarı Kudüs, İslâm’da özel bir yere ve kudsiyete sahiptir. Müslümanların ilk kıblesi olması ve Allah Resûlü’nün İsrâ gecesinde içine girip namaz kıldığı Mescid-i Aksâ’yı bünyesinde barındırması sebebiyle Kudüs, evvela sahabenin sonra da bütün İslâm âleminin ilgi odağı hâline gelmiştir. Bu makalede, faziletine dair ayet ve hadislerin bulunduğu, tarihî ve manevî değeri yüksek yerlerden biri olan Kudüs topraklarına ve Mescid-i Aksâ’ya gerek Hz. Peygamber döneminde gerekse Hz. Peygamber’in vefatından sonra sahabenin gösterdiği ilgi ve bu ilginin sebepleri üzerinde durulacaktır. Ayrıca sahabenin (...) Mescid-i Aksâ’ya ve İsrâ hadisesine fazla önem vermediğine veya ilgi göstermediğine dair günümüzde ileri sürülen bazı farklı görüş ve iddialar eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla ele alınıp değerlendirilecek, bu görüş ve iddiaların ne derece doğru veya tutarlı olduğu ortaya konulmaya çalışılacaktır. (shrink)

Recently, Alvarado (2024) provided a conceptual framework to individuate and identify a specific kind of loneliness, namely epistemic loneliness. According to him, epistemic loneliness arises in virtue of and responds primarily to an absence of epistemic partners— i.e., willing, able, and actually engaged epistemic peers — as well as the lack of opportunities to engage with such. In this paper I argue that Alvarado’s framework and conceptual analysis of epistemic loneliness allows us to identify yet another kind of loneliness, namely (...) one that can only be addressed at an axiological level. As we will see, this loneliness arises in virtue of and is particularly responsive to value-affirming, value-creating, and value exchanging circumstances, peers and contexts. Given its source and the factors which have an effect on it (either increase it or decrease it), this kind of loneliness is significantly distinct from epistemic loneliness. As will be shown here, we can have axiologically antagonistic epistemic partners. If this is so, it is possible that one can have epistemic partners, in the sense defined by Alvarado, and still be axiologically lonely. Axiological loneliness may prove to be even more central than epistemic loneliness already is to a person’s social, psychological and personal sense of belonging and hence of well-being. (shrink)

It is argued that the analysis by which the gene are differentiated in the dialogue is an exercise in studied ambiguities informed by an Eleatic logic of strict dichotomy that was the underpinning of the Sophist's method of division. By this dialectical drill, Plato shows that the metaphysics underlying the Visitor's method fails to adequately distinguish what it means to have a character from what it means to be a character, and therefore remains inadequate to track down the sophist or (...) to distinguish him from the philosopher: Eleaticism, as critically examined by Plato, proves to be means to disguise, not to discover the sophist. (shrink)

The Disputationes Theologiae from 1655 of Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) is structured after the model of the medieval commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences and hence has a large section in the first part on divine knowledge. Within this section, called Disputation on the Divine Intellect (Disputatio de Divino Intellectu), Mastri’s long and nuanced discussion of divine foreknowledge merits particular attention. In the time of Mastri, the theological issue of divine foreknowledge and its relation to human freedom had gained (...) particular prominence, with the Jesuits and the Thomists each opting for their particular doctrine on this subject as well as the related topics of grace and predestination, thereby competing to establish the definitive Roman Catholic reaction to the Protestant and Reformed views on these matters. Mastri, entering the debate at a rather late stage (almost half a century after Paul V’s famous attempt in 1607 to call off the controversy De Auxiliis by prohibiting any further polemics on the subject of grace), sets out to locate a clearly Scotist position in this rather peculiar historical landscape called Early Modern theology. This article discusses Mastri's contribution to the debate and highlights its coherence with other aspects of Mastri's doctrine of divine knowledge. (shrink)

L’accueil dans les services de soin de personnes issues de la migration est un enjeu de santé mentale et éthique et relève d’une réflexion sur la prise en compte de leur vulnérabilité, a fortiori quand des enjeux de parentalité s’en mêlent. Cet article est un témoignage de l’équipe de pédopsychiatrie de Caen qui a adapté ses dispositifs de soins pour mieux accueillir ces publics spécifiques que sont les familles migrantes. Après un rappel sur les notions de migration, de culture et (...) de périnatalité en contexte migratoire, les deux dispositifs seront présentés et explicités au regard de leur fondation théorique qu’est la clinique transculturelle. (shrink)

This book symposium contribution provides responses to four commentaries on my book Choosing Well: The Good, the Bad, and the Trivial. The authors of the commentaries are Michael Bratman, Mark Budolfson, Sergio Tenenbaum, and Johanna Thoma. Although doing justice to all of the interesting points raised by the commentators is out of the question, I respond to some of the main issues raised (proceeding in alphabetical order by the commentators’ last names), launching my responses with a discussion of Bratman’s question (...) “Why stop with adding categorial appraisals?” and wrapping them up with my response to Thoma’s contrasting question “Do we need categorial appraisal responses?” Notably, some responses require me to get more “in the weeds” than others. Hopefully, this is for the better rather than for the worse, and will give the reader a taste of both some big picture issues and some more intricate complications involved in developing and defending my approach. (shrink)

Les auteurs présentent les pratiques des collectifs d’architectes, designers, artistes et citoyens qui occupent le devant de la scène depuis la fin des années 1990 dans les espaces urbains, en formulant l’hypothèse qu’ils s’inspirent (de façon plus ou moins consciente et explicite) des écrits et des expérimentations menées par les représentants de la mouvance architecturale dite « radicale » qui les a précédés dans les années 1970. Dans cette perspective, ils analysent en particulier l’héritage de la notion d’« utopie réalisable (...) » développée par l’architecte Yona Friedman. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology, as Helmuth Plessner has explored it, vindicates its relative priority towards ethics, because it can set out the anthropological prerequisites for considering the moral subject as the embodied person. This claim, however, is still an open question. Walter Schulz has argued that the prevalence of science in contemporary life brings ethics to the fore and forces philosophical anthropology to an auxiliary exploration of ‘leading figures of thehuman’. Jürgen Habermas endorses Plessner’s exploration of the issue of the body, in (...) order to oppose biotechnological naturalism. Thus, he enlarges his discourse on ethics through the ethics of the human species by defining the moral agent as the embodied person. Nevertheless, philosophical anthropology is a broader theoretical endeavour that cannot be reduced to ethics. (shrink)

A Philosophy of Mitzvot by Rabbi Dr. Gersion Appel sets forth the Hinnukh's objectives and his approach to revealing the religious and ethical meaning of the mitzvot. In his wide-ranging study, the author presents a comprehensive view of Jewish philosophy as developed by the Hinnukh and the classical Jewish philosophers. The Hinnukh emerges in this study as a great educator and moral and religious guide, and his classic work as a treasure-trove of Jewish knowledge, religious inspiration, and brilliant insight in (...) the molding of human character. (shrink)

Using Steel's recent result that assuming AD, in L[R] below Θ, κ is regular $\operatorname{iff} \kappa$ is measurable, we mimic below Θ certain earlier results of Gitik. In particular, we construct via forcing a model in which all uncountable cardinals below Θ are singular and a model in which the only regular uncountable cardinal below Θ is ℵ 1.

We give a new proof using iterated Prikry forcing of Magidor's theorem that it is consistent to assume that the least strongly compact cardinal is the least supercompact cardinal.

Say that κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}’s measurability is destructible if there exists a κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}. It then follows that A1={δ<κ∣δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{1} = \{\delta < \kappa \mid \delta}$$\end{document} is measurable, δ is not a limit of measurable cardinals, δ is not δ+ strongly compact, and δ’s measurability is destructible when forcing with partial orderings having rank below λδ} is unbounded (...) in κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}. On the other hand, under the same hypotheses, A2={δ<κ∣δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{2} = \{\delta < \kappa \mid \delta}$$\end{document} is measurable, δ is not a limit of measurable cardinals, δ is not δ+ strongly compact, and δ′s measurability is indestructible when forcing with either Add or Add} is unbounded in κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document} as well. The large cardinal hypothesis on λ is necessary, as we further demonstrate by constructing via forcing two distinct models in which either A1=∅\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{1} = \emptyset}$$\end{document} or A2=∅\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{2} = \emptyset}$$\end{document}. In each of these models, both of which have restricted large cardinal structures above κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}, every measurable cardinal δ which is not a limit of measurable cardinals is δ+ strongly compact, and there is an indestructibly supercompact cardinal κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}. In the model in which A1=∅\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A_{1} = \emptyset}$$\end{document}, every measurable cardinal δ which is not a limit of measurable cardinals is <λδ strongly compact and has its <λδ strong compactness indestructible when forcing with δ-directed closed partial orderings having rank below λδ. The choice of the least beth fixed point above δ is arbitrary, and other values of λδ are also possible. (shrink)

If κ < λ are such that κ is a strong cardinal whose strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing and λ is weakly compact, then we show thatA = {δ < κ | δ is a non-weakly compact Mahlo cardinal which reflects stationary sets}must be unbounded in κ. This phenomenon, however, need not occur in a universe with relatively few large cardinals. In particular, we show how to construct a model where no cardinal is supercompact up to a (...) Mahlo cardinal in which the least supercompact cardinal κ is also the least strongly compact cardinal, κ 's strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing, κ 's supercompactness is indestructible under κ -directed closed forcing not adding any new subsets of κ, and δ is Mahlo and reflects stationary sets iff δ is weakly compact. In this model, no strong cardinal δ < κ is indestructible under δ -strategically closed forcing. It therefore follows that it is relatively consistent for the least strong cardinal κ whose strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing to be the same as the least supercompact cardinal, which also has its supercompactness indestructible under κ -directed closed forcing not adding any new subsets of κ. (shrink)

Suppose λ > κ is measurable. We show that if κ is either indestructibly supercompact or indestructibly strong, then A = {δ < κ | δ is measurable, yet δ is neither δ + strongly compact nor a limit of measurable cardinals} must be unbounded in κ. The large cardinal hypothesis on λ is necessary, as we further demonstrate by constructing via forcing two models in which ${A = \emptyset}$ . The first of these contains a supercompact cardinal κ and (...) is such that no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ’s supercompactness is indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing, and every measurable cardinal δ < κ is δ + strongly compact. The second of these contains a strong cardinal κ and is such that no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ’s strongness is indestructible under < κ-strategically closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing, and level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. The model from the first of our forcing constructions is used to show that it is consistent, relative to a supercompact cardinal, for the least cardinal κ which is both strong and has its strongness indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing to be the same as the least supercompact cardinal, which has its supercompactness indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing. It further follows as a corollary of the first of our forcing constructions that it is possible to build a model containing a supercompact cardinal κ in which no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ is indestructibly supercompact, and every measurable cardinal δ < κ which is not a limit of measurable cardinals is δ + strongly compact. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel position in the philosophy of logic: I argue that _validity_ is a thick concept. Hence, I propose to consider _validity_ in analogy to other thick concepts, such as _honesty_, _selfishness_ or _justice_. This proposal is motivated by the debate on the normativity of logic: while logic textbooks seem simply descriptive in their presentation of logical truths, many have argued that logic has consequences for how we ought to reason, for what we ought to believe, or (...) for what we ought to infer. How can logic be normative, if it appears to be descriptive? According to the proposal of this paper, the normativity of logic can be explained because a thick concept is in play: _validity_. Thus, I argue that the debate on how to best characterize validity and the debate on logic’s normativity are more connected than we think, because _validity_ is a thick concept. (shrink)

This article delves into the intricacies of casta paintings, particularly focusing on the anonymous eighteenth-century work, Las Castas, produced in Mexico. Las Castas serves as a testimony to the complexities of colonial racialized subjectivity. More precisely, Las Castas presents us with a depiction of mestizaje as a rigid system of social stratification, with black individuals occupying a predetermined and inescapable role. The article introduces the irreversibility thesis, challenging prevailing notions of the race mixing process (mestizaje) in colonial Latin America, and (...) asserting that being of black descent, contrary to being of indigenous and Spaniard descent (mestizo), was considered an irreversible stain determining one’s social position within the mestizaje process. This article explores the genre of casta paintings as a colonial artifact and highlights the complexities inherent in colonial subjectivity through a taxonomic visual epistemology lens. (shrink)

This paper has three aims: first, to present in a clear way Newton da Costa’s argument against the necessity of logical laws. In order to do so, we need to clearly advance his views on the idea that logic is context-relative, and not known a priori. Doing so, however, requires that we present his methodology for the development of counter-examples to logical laws: the use of hypothetical models in logic. Given that this method has been overlooked in most discussions on (...) the epistemology of logic, our second goal is to present da Costa’s views on it carefully. The discussion of some tensions resulting from the relation of a system of logic and the context it governs, in da Costa’s approach, is our third goal. Basically, da Costa seems to swing between two incompatible views on such relation, requiring sometimes that a logic is dependent on a context, and in other cases, that the nature of the context is dependent on a logic. Bringing this to light may also benefit current discussions on logical relativism. (shrink)

Cet article propose d’élargir le débat sur la transition énergétique au-delà du contexte occidental. Partant d’études de cas situées dans deux métropoles des Suds, la réflexion invite à nuancer les scénarios normatifs et supposés universels de transformation des systèmes énergétiques pour confronter les transitions aux singularités des sociétés et des territoires dans lesquels elles prennent forme. Ainsi s’aperçoit-on que les discours sur le changement climatique global ont bien moins d’effets d’entraînement sur les trajectoires énergétiques d’Istanbul et du Cap que l’impact (...) de crises écologiques plus locales ou que l’évolution de compromis socio-politiques, toujours fragiles et dépendants d’héritages historiques nationaux. (shrink)

The question of what exactly is irrational about recalcitrant emotions—those that occur in tension or conflict with our beliefs—has been widely debated. Sabine Döring claims that such irrationality only emerges if we act on our recalcitrant emotion or engage in emotion-relevant reasoning in light of it. I here provide an account that acts as an extension to the latter part of this claim by considering in more depth the question of what is irrational about that reasoning, i.e., emotionally recalcitrant reasoning. (...) In doing so, I offer a somewhat alternative explanation to Döring's as to the form of irrationality involved. Where Döring argues that emotionally recalcitrant reasoning involves epistemic irrationality by way of conflicting judgments that are involved, I argue that our engagement in this reasoning is, in fact, practically irrational. This is because, I claim, it involves us “accepting”—treating as true—propositions that we do not believe to be true, in the absence of the kind of reasons that would usually rationalize doing so. Doing so constitutes a form of practical, rather than epistemic, irrationality. This is a conclusion I arrive at through a consideration of the nature of the reasoning our emotions in general tend to motivate. (shrink)

Series Copy Oxford's celebrated Very Short Introductions series offers concise and original introductions to a wide range of subjects--from Islam to Sociology, Politics to Classics, Literary Theory to History, and Archaeology to the Bible. Each volume provides trenchant and provocative--yet always balanced and complete--discussions of the central issues in a given discipline or field. Every Very Short Introduction gives a readable evolution of the subject in question, demonstrating how the subject developed in its own right and how it influenced society. (...) Whatever the area of study one deems important or appealing, whatever topic fascinates the general reader, the Very Short Introduction series has a handy and affordable guide that will likely prove indispensable. (shrink)

Cette étude a pour but de situer la discussion sur l'égalité économique dans le contexte existentiel qui lui est approprié. Interprétant le système économique non seulement comme un système de production et de distribution, mais aussi comme un lieu où s'opère une certaine forme de « colmatage existentiel » individuel, nous étudions les rouages enfouis du système économique qui pourraient expliquer pourquoi les arguments classiques d'incitation, souvent invoqués par la théorie économique égalitariste, peuvent cacher des obstacles puissants à l'égalité. Nous (...) mettons en question les approches des incitations développées par G. A. Cohen et Philippe Van Parijs et nous avançons une approche existentielle inspirée notamment de Norman O. Brown et de Ernest Becker, selon qui l' économie peut aisément devenir le lieu du déni de la corporéité et de la mortalité. L'égalité économique, dès lors, ne peut être atteinte pleinement qu'en couplant la philosophie politique avec l'analyse existentielle et spirituelle des conditions d'assumption individuelle du corps mortel. This study seeks to locate the discussion on economic equality within an appropriate existential context. Seeing the economic system not only as a system of production and distribution, but also as the locus where a certain form of individual « existential containment » is taking place, we study those buried underpinnings of the economic system which could explain why classical incentive arguments often used by economists might hide powerful obstacles to equality. The approaches to incentives proposed by G. A. Cohen and Philippe Van Parijs are discussed and questioned, and an alternative approach is suggested, inspired partially by Norman O. Brown and Ernest Becker, for whom the economy can easily become the locus of a denial of corporeity and mortality. Thus, economic equality can be fully attained only by coupling political philosophy with the existential and spiritual analysis of the conditions under which individuals can accept their mortal body. (shrink)

Enracinée dans la prière, fondée sur la Bible seule, centrée sur le Christ, et insistant sur la lutte contre le Malin, sur l'engagement éthique et sur la proximité du Royaume de Dieu, la théologie de Martin Luther, soutenue par le courage et l'humour d'un écrivain hors du commun, rencontre maintes préoccupations théologiques actuelles ; mais elle interpelle aussi des théologies souvent embarrassées par le sola scriptura et le solus Christus, promptes à faire de l'homme une victime et limitant l'eschatologie à (...) l'avènement du Christ dans l'intériorité du croyant. De la théologie contemporaine, elle peut apprendre que toute exégèse est située, que l'assertion n'est pas le seul registre du discours théologique, que le dialogue religieux ne se réduit pas à l'anathème et que l'action de Dieu dans l'histoire n'est pas univoque. Martin Luther's theology is rooted in prayer, founded only on the Bible, and centred on Christ ; it lays stress on the struggle against the Devil, on moral commitment, and on the proximity of God's Kingdom ; it is kept up by the courage and humour of an extraordinary writer. As such, it meets with many modern theological preoccupations, but it also challenges theologies that are often embarrassed by the sola scriptura and the solus Christus, theologies that are ready to victimize man and limit eschatology to the coming of Christ into the believer's inner self. From contemporaneous theology it can learn that each exegesis has its context, that doing theology does not only consist of uttering statements, that the religious dialogue does not confine itself to the anathema, and that God's acts in history are not univocal. (shrink)

This paper presents criticisms of the method for moral and political philosophy known as ?reflective equilibrium? (RE), or in its fuller form ?wide reflective equilibrium? (WRE). This negative purpose has an ulterior positive aim: to set off, by favourable contrast, an alternative approach based on analogical argument as an instrument of an evolving (liberal) tradition. WRE derives from John Rawls but has been broadly endorsed. Though a meta?theory, it involves a certain way of construing liberalism. This essay's target is in (...) key part that construal. It seeks an approach to moral?political philosophy, and to liberalism in particular, that is at once rationally grounded and contextually oriented, and provides for explanation as well as justification. WRE fails on all counts, plus others. Section I presents WRE and suggests the alternative. Section II presents the critique of WRE, partly drawing on established criticisms and partly presenting new ones. Section III opposes the application suggested for WRE by (surprisingly) a critic of Rawls, M. Sandel. The preferability of the analogical alternative is demonstrated throughout. (shrink)

Parfit (Theoria 82:110–127, 2016) responded to the Sequence Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing imprecise equality. However, Parfit’s notion of imprecise equality lacked structure. Hájek and Rabinowicz (2022) improved on Parfit’s proposal in this regard, by introducing a notion of degrees of incommensurability. Although Hájek and Rabinowicz’s proposal is a step forward, and may help solve many paradoxes, it can only avoid the Repugnant Conclusion at great cost. First, there is a sequential argument for the Repugnant Conclusion that uses (...) weaker and intuitively more compelling assumptions than the Sequence Argument, and which Hájek and Rabinowicz’s proposal only undermines, in a principled way, by allowing for implausible weight to be put on the disvalue of inequality. Second, if Hájek and Rabinowicz do put such implausible weight on the disvalue of inequality, then they will have to accept that a population A is not worse than another same sized population B even though everyone in B is better off than anyone in A. (shrink)

_Abstract: _The scholarship on deep disagreements presents us with a considerable number of seemingly disparate characterizations concerning the nature of these disputes. This paper is motivated by the desire to grasp what these characterizations are. An answer is provided through the method of reconstructive analysis. Two ideal and paradigmatic models of deep disagreements are defined initially. Then, individual characterizations found in the scholarship are examined against the background of such models. Special attention is given to Fogelin’s paper, the work that (...) initiates modern discussion on deep disagreements. According to the interpretation provided in the following paper, both models inadvertently coexist in this seminal work. _ _ _Résumé: _Les études sur les désaccords profonds nous présentent un nombre considérable de propriétés apparemment disparates concernant la nature de ces conflits. La rédaction de cet article est motivée par le désir de comprendre quelles sont ces propriétés. Une réponse est fournie par la méthode de l'analyse reconstructive. Deux modèles idéaux et paradigmatiques des désaccords profonds sont d'abord définis. Ensuite, les propriétés individuelles trouvées dans les études sont examinées dans le contexte de ces modèles. Une attention particulière est accordée à l'article de Fogelin, l'ouvrage qui initie la discussion moderne sur les désaccords profonds. Selon l'interprétation fournie dans l'article suivant, les deux modèles coexistent par inadvertance dans cet ouvrage fondateur. (shrink)

Vahyin akılla, bilimin dinle, benliğin yaratıcıyla, dünyanın ahiretle çeliştiğini düşünen Batı modernitesi en güçlü etkisini kendi yuvası Avrupa’da gösterdikten kısa bir süre sonra 18. yüzyılda komşu topraklara Afrika ve Asya’ya dünya görüşünü neşretmiştir. Napolyon’un Mısır işgali kuşkusuz bu etkinin Arap dünyası sathında kıvılcımı olmuştur. Başta Mısır insanı olmak üzere tüm Arap dünyası basın ve yayın yoluyla Batı tarzı yaşam tarzı ile tanışmış ve kendi geleneği aleyhinde olumsuz etkilenmiştir. Bu olumsuz etkiyi kendi toplumunda gören Menfalûtî, halkına karşı sorumluluk hisleriyle vaaz ve (...) irşat içerikli edebi eserler ortaya koymuştur. Ancak onun bu eserlerinde çoğu zaman karamsar bir üslup kullandığı ifade edilmiştir. Hikâyelerinde seçtiği karakterlerin başlarına gelen acı felaketlerin eserlerine melankolik bir hava kattığı belirtilmiştir. Bu makale yazarın bu karamsar üslubu benimsemesinin nedenlerinden biri üzerine duracaktır. (shrink)

The major work of Gilbert of Tournai is intriguingly titled with a double name: "Rudimentum/ Erudimentum Doctrinae." In the preface, Gilbert mentions this dual designation but does not provide further clarification on its significance. This issue has mostly gone unnoticed, yet the rarity of the term "erudimentum" warrants a deeper examination beyond the assumption of a mere paronomastic play. Therefore, this paper first aims to explore the meanings associated with the term and then to understand its significance concerning with the (...) whole title of Gilbert's work and his programmatic intentions. Additionally, it will consider the only known precedent he may have drawn from, which is the "Elementarium Doctrinae (E)rudimentum" by Papias. For various reasons, the title of Papias's work has also sparked considerable debate among scholars. However, a comparison of the most authoritative versions of the "Elementarium," provided in the appendix, offers a definitive resolution regarding the actual title of this lexicon. (shrink)

Michael Huemer claims to give an ontological proof of robust moral realism, the influential view that we have non-selfish, categorical, observer-independent reasons for action. This paper argues that one of Huemer’s premises – that knowing that baby torture is not objectively wrong would provide us with no first-person reasons to torture babies – is false of agents with sadistic desires. This in turn falsifies Huemer’s further premise that the premises of his “Antitorture Argument” are true independent of interests, desires, or (...) other attitudes. My refutation is then shown to not only deepen extant doubts about whether robust realists can adequately account for the first-person normative authority of morality. It also suggests that realists about categorical moral reasons must either complete a project – moral constructivism – which has never clearly succeeded, or else defend views on the nature of categorical reasons that strain credulity and beg the question against their opponents. (shrink)